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International Transfers and Dutch Disease: 
Evidence from South Asian Countries 
Md. Bakhtiar Uddin† 
Syed Mansoob Murshed±  
 
Abstract 
We investigate the Dutch Disease impact of migrant’s remittances and foreign 
aid using a yearly panel data of eight South Asian countries for the period of 
1975-2013. An increase in per capita remittances erodes international competi-
tiveness by appreciating the real effective exchange rate, also leading to a fall in 
traded to non-traded goods production ratio in the economy; hardly any statis-
tically significant impact of foreign aid on these variables is detected. These point 
to premature deindustrialization consequences of large remittance inflows that 
could slow down structural transformation towards manufacturing. Although 
remittances and foreign aid may have a significant impact on poverty alleviation 
in this region, policy planners should pay attention to more effective utilization 
of remittances and foreign aid.  
Keywords 
Dutch Disease, Foreign aid, Real Effective Exchange Rate, Remittances, Prem-
ature deindustrialization.  
1. Introduction 
 
International transfers of remittances and foreign aid play an important role 
in the total financial inflows into developing countries across the world. Alt-
hough remittances have a positive impact on various socio-economic develop-
ment indicators at both micro and macro level, it also has adverse effects, such 
as the ‘Dutch Disease’. South Asian countries are among the prominent recipi-
ents of both remittances. The aim of this paper is to examine the Dutch Disease 
impact of international transfers in terms of migrant’s remittances and foreign 
aid, using panel data of eight countries in South Asia for the period of 1975 to 
2013 controlling for country heterogeneity and time fixed effects. 
                                                 
† Jatiya Kabi Kazi Nazrul Islam University, Trishal, Mymensingh, Bangladesh, bakhti-
areco@yahoo.com. I am grateful to the Netherlands Fellowship Programme (NFP) for 
financing my study at the ISS.  
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Hague, The Netherlands and Coventry University, UK, murshed@iss.nl. (Corre-
sponding Author). We are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for valu-
able comments that have improved the paper. 
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International transfers have both positive and negative effects on an econ-
omy. On the positive side are a wide range of effects such as increase in interna-
tional reserves, accumulation of human and physical capital, financial develop-
ment and poverty reduction (see Adams and Page 2005, Barajas et al. 2009, 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2005). Remittances improve macroeconomic stability 
and reduce output volatility as well (Chami, Hakura and Montiel 2009). At the 
micro level, remittances increase household welfare through consumption 
smoothening, and have an important part to play in poverty reduction by raising 
the consumption of poor and near-poor households. Remittances also work as 
insurance for migrant sending households against dips in income due to natural 
calamities, crop failure or economic downturns (Yang 2008, Yang and Choi 
2007). Households those receive remittances may experience a fall in fertility 
(Naufal and Vargas-Silva 2009). Similarly, foreign aid may also bear multifaceted 
benefits in the way of easing balance of payments constraints, financing capital 
goods imports, alleviating poverty; investing in health, education and infrastruc-
ture; thereby stimulating growth (see Burnside and Dollar 2000, Fischer 2009, 
Sachs 2009).  
On the flip side, a large inflow of international transfers such as remittances 
and foreign aid can cause real exchange appreciation, resulting in diminished 
external competitiveness, eventually impacting negatively on the traded (manu-
facturing) sector. This phenomenon has been labeled the “Dutch Disease”, first 
coined in 1977 by The Economist magazine to refer the unfavorable effects of 
gas revenues, following the discovery of natural gas, on the manufacturing sector 
in the Netherlands‡.  
Globally, in 2014, remittances flows to developing countries increased 
to $436 billion, which was a 4.4 percent higher than in 2013 (World Bank, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
‡ The Dutch Disease"(November 26, 1977). The Economist, pp.82-83 (as cited in Nsor-Ambala 
2015) 
Source: Migration and Development Brief 24, World Bank, 2015 
Figure 1: External inflows to developing countries 
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Remittances flows to developing countries have become stable, outpacing Offi-
cial Development Assistance (ODA) and private capital flows (Figure 1).  
Mundell (1957) theoretically demonstrated that factor mobility is a sub-
stitute for international trade in bringing about factor price equalization, and by 
implication convergence of wages and prices. In line with this, certain South 
Asian countries seem to export unskilled or semi-skilled manpower abroad, es-
pecially to the GCC§ countries, earning substantial remittances. According to 
World Bank (2015) statistics, remittances to South Asian countries increased by 
4.5 percent in 2014 compared to a 2.5 increase in 2013. In this region, Pakistan 
saw a sharp rise in remittances (16.6 percent increase), while Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka experienced 9.6 and 8 percent increases, respectively in 2014. However, 
India and Nepal, experienced a fall in remittances.  South Asian countries like 
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are in the top ten remittance recipient countries 
in the world. In terms of remittances receipt, in 2014; India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan were ranked 1st, 7th and 8th, respectively (Figure 1.2). Remittances ac-
count for a substantial proportion of GDP in South Asian countries as well. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, remittances inflows to Nepal accounted for 29 percent of GDP in 
2013. Remittances also accounted for 6 to 10 percent of GDP in Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and India (Figure 3). Moreover, remittances have become 
one of the main sources of international reserves in this region. In Pakistan, re-
mittances were 191 percent of international reserves in 2013, which was the 
highest percentage among all other South Asian countries. While remittances 
                                                 
§ Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Figure 2: Top ten remittance recipient in 2014  
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were 86, 83, 77 and 23 percent of international reserves in Sri Lanka, Nepal, 
Bangladesh, and India, respectively (Figure 3).    
 
Figure 4 shows remittances as percent of total exports of goods and services in 
South Asian countries in 2014. In Nepal, remittances were about two and half 
times of exports. In Bangladesh, Pa-
kistan and Sri Lanka remittances 
were 42 to 56 percent of exports. In 
India, however, this figure was much 
lower (14 percent) compared to 
other South Asian countries.   
  Migrant’s remittances to this 
region have been growing at a high 
rate. Table 1 presents migrant’s re-
mittances figures for three decades. 
During 1980s on average remit-
tances as percent of GDP were 2.7 in 
Bangladesh, whereas the figure in-
creased to average 9.9 during 2010s. 
Within three decades this figure goes up by more than three and half times. It 
also increased by more than three times in India within this time period. Remit-
tances data during 1980s for Nepal are not available. During 2000s on average 
remittances were 13.2   percent of GDP of Nepal and within a decade this figure 
jumps to average 25.4 percent of GDP. Remittances figures also show similar 
upward trends in Sri Lanka. The only exception is Pakistan. During 1980s on 
average remittances were 7.4 percent of GDP, while this figure decreased to 
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Figure 3: Remittances as percent of GDP and international reserves 
in South Asia (2013) 
Source: Migration and Development Brief 24, World Bank, 2015 
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Figure 4: Remittances as percent of 
total exports (2014e)  
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average 5.9 percent of GDP during the first four years of 2010s. Per capita re-
mittances increased more than the share of remittances in GDP. Remittances to 
other three South Asian countries, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Maldives, are not 
substantial.  
Table 1: Decade average of remittances and foreign aid   
Country 
1980s 2000s 2010s*** 
Remit-
tance(
% of 
GDP) 
Remit-
tance 
(per cap-
ita)** 
 Aid 
(% of 
GDP) 
Aid*( Per 
capita) 
Remit-
tance(
% of 
GDP) 
Remit-
tance 
(per 
capita) 
Aid 
(% of 
GDP) 
Aid( Per 
capita) 
Remit-
tance(% 
of GDP) 
Remit-
tance 
(per 
capita) 
Aid 
(% of 
GDP) 
Aid( 
Per cap-
ita) 
Afghanistan  _ _ 0.8 3.219 1.122 4.678 40.3 107.348 1.996 12.999 37.2 229.442 
Bangladesh 2.699 6.082 6.467 14.621 7.241 35.742 2.105 9.344 9.944 84.434 1.445 12.517 
Bhutan _ _ 11.6 50.112 0.290 4.929 10.9 129.583 0.689 16.499 8.3 198.469 
India 1.067 3.247 0.784 2.376 3.092 23.652 0.204 1.393 3.471 51.608 0.139 2.066 
Maldives  1.549 8.611 17.2 82.086 0.282 11.529 3.2 121.122 0.145 9.402 3.3 215.457 
Nepal - - 9.670 16.612 13.182 49.094 6.145 20.269 25.367 176.941 4.404 30.638 
Pakistan 7.395 25.129 2.840 9.802 3.808 28.187 1.642 11.167 5.937 71.158 1.295 15.129 
Sri Lanka 5.117 18.601 8.480 30.572 7.625 99.268 2.477 31.166 9.172 263.826 0.912 25.458 
Notes: *Aid consists of Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) plus official foreign aid. ** Both remittances per 
capita and aid per capita are in US $. *** Up to 2013. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Development Indicators (WDI) 2014, World Bank. 
 
Foreign aid flows, however, to South Asia are not as significant as remittances. 
Only Afghanistan receives a substantial amount of foreign aid. In the 2000s and 
2010s, on average, foreign aid to Afghanistan were 40.3 and 37.2 per cent of 
GDP, respectively. Bhutan also received aid amounting to about 10 percent of 
its GDP during the study period. Table 1 reveals that the GDP share of foreign 
aid was higher than remittances in the 1980s, and then foreign aid’s importance 
gradually diminished. Each year a great number of people from South Asian 
countries migrate abroad for better employment opportunities. In Bangladesh 
from 1976 to 2015, a total of about 9.5 million (about 5.93 percent of total pop-
ulation) workers have migrated to all over the world for employment**. There 
are five million Indian workers across the globe††. The Indian diaspora consti-
tutes 25 million people in some 110 countries, which is the second largest dias-
pora in the world (Afram, 2012). In Nepal, a total of about 2 million people 
(about 7.3% of total population) were reported missing in 2011 census. They are 
                                                 
** Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), Ministry of Expatriates’ 
Welfare and Overseas Employment, Bangladesh.      
†† Annual Report, 2014-15, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, India 
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believed to be working abroad‡‡. Up to December 2013, a total of 7.8 million 
Pakistanis (about 4.17 % of the population) were living/working/studying all 
over the world§§. An estimated 1.7 million (almost 25% of total population) Sri 
Lankans were employed abroad in 2013***. As a whole, a total of 70 million peo-
ple of South Asian origin live around the world (Burki 2013, as cited in Rahman 
2014:3). In addition to this, each year a good number of workers migrate to other 
countries through illegal channels.  
This study emphasizes the premature deindustrialization perspective in 
South Asian countries as a consequence of Dutch Disease effects of migrant 
remittances and foreign aid. Earlier studies put little or no emphasis on the re-
source movement effect. Thus, this paper will contribute to the literature of the 
Dutch Disease effects in South Asian countries resulting from international 
transfers.  Section 2 outlines the theoretical approach and existing empirical lit-
erature, section 3 presents the methodology and data, section 4 contains our 
results, followed by conclusions in section 5.  
2. Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence   
       
The issue of international transfers was debated between John Maynard 
Keynes and Bertil Ohlin in 1929 in connection with German reparation pay-
ments following the First World War. According to Keynes, the reparation pay-
ments were a burden to Germany; the transfer would require price and cost re-
ductions in the export sector, which in turn would cause a deterioration in terms 
of trade. Ohlin, however, argued that because of income effects on the recipients 
of transfers, the terms of trade in the donor country would be unchanged (Brak-
man and Marrewijk 1998: 22). Leontief (1936) argued that the donor would gain 
from an international transfer. Samuelson (1947), however, pointed out that in 
a two-good, two-country, distortion-free Walrasian competitive equilibrium, the 
welfare of the recipient would increase at the expense of the donor.  
Salter (1959) and Swan’s (1960) seminal work showed a rise in domestic 
spending due to the transfer, and an appreciation of the real exchange rate due 
to the balance of payments surplus in a small open economy. Also, because of 
the spending effect, the demand for non-tradables increases along with its rela-
tive price. Consequently, there is a resource re-allocation with productive re-
sources moving to the non-traded sector from the traded sector. This is the es-
sence of what was later termed the Dutch Disease. Corden and Neary (1982) 
                                                 
‡‡ Labour Migration for Employment: A Status Report for Nepal, 2013/14, Ministry of       
Labour and Employment, Nepal.    
§§ Final year book 2013-14, Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource De-
velopment, Pakistan.   
*** Ministry of Foreign Employment, Sri Lanka.  
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discuss the similar, Dutch Disease, impact of natural resource revenue gains. 
International transfer like remittances and foreign aid also act like inflows of 
natural resource revenue. The two effects, spending and resource reallocation to 
the non-traded sector, can shrink the traded (agricultural or manufacturing sec-
tors).   
Krugman (1987) explains that inflows of international transfers like nat-
ural resource revenue appreciates real exchange rate and some of the traded sec-
tor lose competitiveness and move abroad. If the transfer does not last long, 
external competitiveness is regained, but long lasting and substantial  transfers 
erodes international competitiveness in some tradable sectors permanently. In 
that case, both merchandise export market share and international competitive-
ness decline. Thus, temporary resource booms cause a permanent loss of com-
petitiveness. For developing countries, this means that their future potential for 
exporting manufactured goods and diversifying the production base is stunted. 
If there are positive externalities from human-capital accumulation in manufac-
turing only, as in Matsuyama (1992), and transfers retard the development of the 
more dynamic manufacturing sector, the growth path of the economy under free 
trade is lower than that of other countries.   
Lopez, Monila and Bussolo (2008) explain that international transfers 
especially remittances can appreciate the real exchange rate firstly, by increasing 
the net foreign asset position of the remittance receiving country in relation to 
rest of the world. Secondly, changes in sectoral productivity can also take place. 
Remittances induce demand for non-tradables, redirecting labour there from the 
traded sector, thereby increasing relative real wages in the tradable sector. This 
differential leads to real exchange rate appreciation (Ballasa-Samuelson effect).  
Acosta et al. (2009) find Dutch Disease impacts of remittances in El Sal-
vador. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) find Dutch Disease symptoms 
caused by remittances, appreciating the real exchange rate in 13 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. Lartey et al. (2012) find remittances induced Dutch 
Disease in a panel of 109 developing countries that operate more strongly under 
fixed exchange rates. Bourdet  and  Falck (2007) find less strong adverse effect 
of remittances on the competitiveness of tradables. In South Asian countries, 
Dutch Disease symptoms have also been evident. Chowdhury and Rabbi (2013) 
show that workers’ remittances cause real exchange rate appreciation in Bangla-
desh, which in turn causes loss of competitiveness in export markets. Mughal 
and Makhlouf (2013) find Dutch Disease effects of remittances in the economy 
of Pakistan. On the other hand, Ratha (2013) does not find any Dutch Disease 
symptoms in India.     
By contrast, Nyoni (1998) finds that foreign aid depreciates the real ex-
change in Tanzania. Martins (2013) does not find any Dutch Disease phenome-
non in the Ethiopian economy. Barajas et al. (2011) explain that the impact of 
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remittances on equilibrium real exchange rate comes through variety of macro-
economic channels. It depends on the remittance-receiving country’s character-
istics, pattern of remittance inflows (cyclical or not), long-run investment posi-
tion induced by remittance inflows, and utilization of remittances (whether spent 
on non-traded or traded goods). The authors find mixed evidence of remittances 
on equilibrium real exchange rate in both single-country and a panel setting.  
Foreign aid was thought to bridge the gap between demand and supply 
of capital in developing countries. However, to reap the benefits of aid presence 
of some good policies is very much important. Burnside and Dollar (2000) find 
that foreign aid is effective in accelerating growth of GDP in developing coun-
tries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies. If aid is not channeled into 
investment rather than consumption, it causes a rise in the relative price of non-
tradables, thereby appreciating real exchange rate. Rajan and Subramanian 
(2006), with a cross country panel data analysis, show that one percentage point 
increase in the ratio of aid-to-GDP is associated with 0.2-0.3 percentage point 
reduction in the share of manufacturing sector to total GDP. Prati and Tressel 
(2006) find similar negative effects of aid on overall export sector. Empirical 
evidence of aid induced Dutch Disease is thus mixed. Countries where aid is 
used as investment and aid raises productivity in non-tradables there is no Dutch 
Disease effect, whereas countries where aid induces consumption of more non-
tradable goods and services there is a Dutch Disease effect. Effects of interna-
tional transfers on growth of manufacturing sector also found mixed. Rajan and 
Subramanian (2011) find a negative impact of foreign aid on the growth rate of 
manufacturing sector in 47 developing countries whereas, Dzansi (2013) finds 
positive effects of remittances on the growth of manufacturing sector in a num-
ber of remittance dependent economies.  
 3. Methodology and Data  
This study attempts to examine the relationship between external inflows 
(remittances and foreign aid) and the real exchange rate (REER), as well as 
changes in the relative composition of output between traded and non-traded 
goods. Consequently, we run two separate regressions: one for the Spending Effect, 
the other capturing the Resource Reallocation Effect.  
Spending effect equation: 
 
REERit = β0 + β1 REMit + β2 ODAit + β3 FDIit + β4 OPENit + β5 TOTit + β6 
GOVEXit + β7 GDPPC+ β8 M2+ γt+vi+ eit --------------(1) 
 
Resource reallocation equation: 
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TNTit = β0 + β1 REMit + β2 ODAit + β3 FDIit + β4 OPENit + β5 TOTit + β6 
GOVEXit + β7 GDPPC+ β8 M2+ δt+λi + μit --------------(2) 
            i= 1, 2…., N   t=1, 2….., T 
Where, 
REER= Real Effective Exchange Rate   
REM= Migrant’s Remittances (percent of GDP/ per capita) 
ODA= Net Official Development Assistance and official aid received (percent 
of GDP/ per capita) 
FDI= Net Foreign Direct Investment (percent of GDP) 
OPEN= Trade Openness (sum of exports and imports as percent of GDP) 
TOT= Net Barter Terms of Trade  
GOVEX= General government final consumption expenditure (percent of 
GDP) 
GDPPC= GDP per capita (current US $) 
M2= Money and quasi money (percent of GDP) 
γt   and δt = Time fixed effect  
vi  and λi = Time invariant country fixed effect  
eit  and μit = error terms  
Details on the data sources and definitions are given in the appendix. 
From the theoretical perspective (Corden and Neary 1982, Krugman 1987) it is 
evident that inflows of remittances may act like inflows of natural resource rev-
enues, which may appreciate the real exchange rate. Therefore, a positive sign 
for remittances (REM) in equation (1) is expected. In order to control for non-
linearties in this mechanism we will also incorporate the square of the remittance 
to GDP ratio. Foreign Aid/ODA is an international transfer like remittances. 
Thus, a positive sign for Aid/ODA is expected in equation (1) as well. Similarly, 
large FDI inflows appreciate REER.     
    According to the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis (see Balassa 1964 and 
Samuelson 1964), differences in productivity may have implications for the 
REER appreciation. To capture this effect we have employed GDP per capita 
for each country as a proxy for productivity differentials (see Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo 2004). We expect that countries with higher GDP per capita (GDPPC) 
to experience REER appreciation. Therefore a positive sign is expected in equa-
tion (1) for this variable.  
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Government expenditure can change the relative price of non-tradables 
which can influence REER in turn. If the expenditures fall disproportionately 
on the non-traded sector, then prices of non-tradables will increase which will 
appreciate the REER (Froot and Rogoff 1995, as cited in Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo 2004). But if it falls disproportionately on the traded sector, then it will 
depreciate the REER (Montiel 1999:279, as cited in Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
2004).  
External terms of trade (TOT) may influence the REER. If relative 
wages in tradables increase without a rise in labour productivity, it will appreciate 
REER. Therefore, we expect positive sign for TOT in equation (1).  
Trade openness (OPEN) has been included to capture the effect of trade 
restrictions on REER determination. An increase in import tariff reduces in-
come, which in turn reduces demand for all goods and services. A fall in demand 
for non-tradables will reduce prices and, thereby depreciating REER (Lartey et 
al. 2012).On the other hand, the substitution effect induces a switch to non-
tradables from imported goods after an increase in import tariff, causing prices 
of non-tradables to rise leading to REER appreciation (Edwards 1989, as cited 
in Lartey et al. 2012).Therefore, in equation (1) either a negative or positive as-
sociation is expected. Broad money (M2) may cause real exchange rate appreci-
ation through increased money supply and the associated inflation. A positive 
sign is expected for M2 in the equation (1).   
The variables which are expected to have positive signs in equation (1) 
are likely to have negative signs in equation (2). This is because a real exchange 
rate appreciation will cause the traded to non-traded ratio to diminish.    
4. Estimation and Analysis  
 
We consider annual panel data from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives and Afghanistan spanning the period from 1975 to 
2013. Data for all variables are not available for all these 38 years and for all 
countries leading to an unbalanced panel. 
We estimated pooled OLS, and also fixed effect models to control for 
time invariant country fixed effects and time fixed effects.  After performing the 
Hausman test we found that fixed effect model is preferred to the random effect 
model. One of our main variables of interest, remittances, may pose endogeneity 
issues. To rectify this problem, we adopt an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach 
to find the true impact of remittances on REER.       
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Pooled OLS Estimation of REER  
    Firstly, we have pooled all yearly data for 8 countries over different years 
spanning from the period of 1975-2013. We have considered both Driscoll-
Kraay (DK) and Cluster-Robust (CR) standard errors. In the case of macro panel 
(long time dimensions and short cross-sections) DK based estimates are more 
efficient than the CR based estimates, as ‘DK standard errors are heteroskedas-
ticity consistent and robust to general forms of cross-sectional (spatial) and tem-
poral dependence when the time dimension becomes large’ (Hoechle 2007: 286).  
Our data set is an unbalanced macro panel consisting of only 8 countries 
(cross sections) and on average a time period of 30 years. The data suffer from 
the presence of heteroskedasticy, cross sectional dependency (error terms of 
cross sections are dependent) and autocorrelation. In that case cluster-robust 
standard errors will give inefficient estimates, whereas Driscoll-Kraay standard 
error will give more efficiency. In table 2 we see that under DK and CR standard 
errors estimations values of coefficients are all the same but values of standard 
errors are slightly higher in DK estimation.   
Table 2 reports regression results of the relation between real effective 
exchange rate and our main variables of interest (remittances and foreign aid). 
In all specifications both remittances as percent of GDP and remittances as per 
capita have the expected positive sign and are statistically highly significant. This 
indicates that remittances appreciate REER. If we were to drop Bhutan, Mal-
dives and Afghanistan from the sample, the coefficient becomes smaller (0.027). 
The squared term on the remittances to GDP ratio is negative and highly signif-
icant, indicating a non-linearity in this process. This means that after a threshold, 
which we identify to be 14.64 % of GDP remittances begin to depreciate the 
REER. This may be because of some initial REER over-appreciation. Alterna-
tively, the non-linearity may indicate that other factors become more salient, 
such as a substantial merchandise export decline causing balance of payments 
problems, eventually driving these economies to regain international competi-
tiveness via depreciating real exchange rates. Foreign aid (ODA), in both 
measures (percent of GDP and per capita), has a negative sign and is statistically 
highly significant, indicating that aid depreciates REER.  
 
Table 2: Pooled OLS estimates of REER, with Driscoll-Kraay and cluster-robust Stand-
ard Errors 
 
Dependent variable : Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate(REER) 
 With Driscoll-Kraay  Standard Error With Cluster-Robust  Standard Error 
Regressors  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.205***   0.205***  0.205*** 
 (0.029)   (0.027)  (0.029) 
Remittances (% of GDP) squared  -0.007***   -0.007***  -0.007*** 
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 (0.001)   (0.001)   
Log Remittances (per capita)  0.495*** 0.522***  0.495*** 0.522*** 
  (0.059) (0.045)  (0.041) (0.036) 
ODA ( Net ODA+ Official aid % of GDP)  -0.052*** -0.056***  -0.052*** -0.056***  
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per capita)   -0.344***   -0.344*** 
   (0.062)   (0.048) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) -0.030 0.022 0.011 -0.030 0.022 0.011 
 (0.061) (0.042) (0.037) (0.079) (0.055) (0.044) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) 0.129 0.240 -0.055 0.129 0.240** -0.055 
 (0.263) (0.265) (0.066) (0.129) (0.118) (0.113) 
Log trade openness( X+M as % of GDP)  -0.516*** -0.502*** -0.256** -0.516*** -0.502*** -0.256*** 
 (0.181) (0.126) (0.099) (0.107) (0.082) (0.096) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) -0.011 0.005 0.005 -0.011 0.005 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.003 -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log per capita GDP -0.296* -0.731*** -0.548*** -0.296*** -0.731*** -0.548*** 
 (0.161) (0.113) (0.088) (0.102) (0.085) (0.075) 
Constant 7.404*** 8.922*** 9.078*** 7.404*** 8.922*** 9.078*** 
 (1.741) (1.573) (0.792) (0.931) (0.808) (0.653) 
       
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.841 0.901 0.851 0.841 0.901 0.851 
Number of countries 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Notes: In column 1-3 Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in the parenthesis. In column 4-6 Cluster-Robust standard errors are in 
the parenthesis. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  
Asterisk ***,**,* indicates significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
However, the pooled OLS estimates may be biased and inconsistent as 
we have not controlled for the country and time fixed effects. Time-invariant 
unobservable country characteristics might be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. Country fixed characteristics and time variable may also be important 
determinants of REER. In addition, remittances are not purely exogenous.  In 
the next section, we will perform instrumental variable fixed effect estimates 
addressing endogeneity and controlling for time-invariant country effects and 
time fixed effect.  
Instrumental Variable (IV) Fixed Effect Estimation of REER 
There may be a reverse causality between remittances and REER. On 
the one hand, REER depends on remittance inflows; on the other hand, remit-
tance inflows may depend on the level of REER. Remittances could also be 
procyclical and counter cyclical. If remittances are sent as capital for investment 
motives, in the good time of the remittances receiving economy there will be 
more remittance inflows (procyclical), and vice versa. On the other hand, if re-
mittances are sent for altruistic reasons, remittance inflows increase during eco-
nomic downturns (countercyclical). Therefore, in literature it is argued that re-
mittances are endogenous (see Acosta et al. 2009, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
2004, Lartey et al. 2012).  
To remove the problem of potential endogeneity one can opt for instru-
mental variable and system GMM techniques. But in our case system GMM will 
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not be efficient since the data set is a macro panel, large T and small N (Rood-
man 2009). That is why we adopt the IV technique only. In literature various 
instruments for remittances have been proposed, such as school enrollment rate, 
crop and livestock production index, immunization index, literacy rate, eco-
nomic condition of host countries, distance between migrant sending and re-
ceiving countries, stock and flow of migrants, population density, unemploy-
ment rate in sending country etc. We have performed IV fixed effect regression 
using crop production index and primary school enrollment rate as instruments, 
following Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004). Hausman tests suggest that the 
random effects model is a less efficient estimator. It is expected that volume of 
remittances will be higher with a low value of crop production and low level of 
primary school enrollment, and vice versa. Most of the remittances earners in 
South Asian countries are unskilled or semiskilled workers, and they have low 
levels of schooling or no schooling at all. Surplus labour in agriculture, compels 
surplus workers to look for jobs elsewhere, putting pressure on labour markets 
in informal sectors. Thus, a low level of agricultural production and school en-
rollment will increase out migration, thereby increasing the volume of remit-
tances.  
We find negative signs for both crop production index and school en-
rollment ratio in the first stage IV regression for remittances. Coefficients of 
instruments are statistically significant at conventional levels. Both of the instru-
ments passed the test of under identification. Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics 
is statistically significant, which rejects the null of under identification. However, 
the crop production index does not pass the weak instrument test, whereas the 
primary school enrollment ratio is a strong instrument if 3 countries: Afghani-
stan, Bhutan and Maldives are excluded; the previously reliable Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald rk F statistic diminishes substantially with their inclusion. Results of first 
stage IV fixed effect regression are presented in table 3, and results of second 
stage IV fixed effect estimation are presented in table 4.  Due to the lack of an 
instrument for the square of remittances/GDP, we do not experiment with a 
squared term in table 4.  
 
(Continued on next page) 
 
 Table 3: First stage IV Fixed Effect estimates of REER  
 
Dependent variable is Log remittances per capita 
Regressors IV-1 IV-2 
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Log crop production index  -1.019*  
 0.547  
Log primary school enrollment ratio  -1.344** 
  (0.591) 
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per cap-
ita) 
0.059 0.074 
 (0.170) (0.220) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP)       -0.082*** -0.079 
 (0.173) (0.052) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) -0.150 -0.342 
 (0.165) (0.310) 
Log trade openness  0.382 0.279 
 (0.262) (0.351) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) 0.031 0.040 
 (0.025) (0.051) 
M2 (% of GDP) 0.028*** 0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.010)  
Log per capita GDP  0.749 0.596 
 (0.386) (0.617) 
Observations  167 137 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic   (P value )  0.046 0.0379 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 3.48 5.18 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  Asterisk 
***,**,* indicates significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively. Regressions contain time-
fixed effects. IV-1= Log crop production index, IV-2= Primary school enrollment ratio.  
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Like with the pooled OLS remittances also appear with a positive sign 
in the IV fixed effect estimation. Remittances are statistically significant at 1 per-
cent level. Foreign aid (ODA) has the same negative sign as in pooled OLS, but 
here it is not statistically significant at any conventional level. Therefore, foreign 
aid (ODA) does not have any effect on the REER determination. Coefficients 
of remittances differ under the two instruments. With the crop production index 
the coefficient is larger than with the primary school enrollment, the latter being 
more acceptable.    
One may question the validity of REER appreciation if the countries 
follow fixed exchange or managed exchange rate regimes. Under fixed exchange 
rate regime, there will be little direct impact of remittances and foreign aid on 
nominal exchange rates but will lead to reserve accumulation. Most South Asian 
countries pursue fixed or managed exchange rates. Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka have effectively fixed exchange rate regimes, while India has a managed 
floating exchange rate regime (Cavoli and Rajan 2013).    
Table 4: Second stage IV Fixed-Effects estimates of REER 
 
Dependent variable is Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate(REER) 
Regressors IV-1 IV-2 
   
Log Remittances (per capita) 0.457* 0.191* 
 (0.263) (0.110) 
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per capita) 0.010 0.085 
 (0.067) (0.071) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) 0.041 0.003 
 (0.043) (0.040) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) -0.115 -0.231*** 
 (0.104) (0.069) 
Log trade openness  -0.264 -0.070 
 (0.175) (0.129) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) -0.005 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.012) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.004 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Log per capita GDP  0.410 0.788*** 
 (0.320) (0.168) 
   
Observations 167 137 
R-squared 0.512 0.716 
Number of countries 8 8 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes 
Time fixed effect  Yes  Yes 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are ro-
bust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  Asterisk ***,**,* 
indicates significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively.  
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REER determination depends not only on nominal exchange rate but 
also on price levels. With a fixed exchange rate regime an exogenous increase in 
international transfers increases general price levels, thus appreciating REER. 
However, with flexible exchange rate regime, real appreciation happens quickly 
through nominal exchange rate appreciation. Under a fixed exchange rate regime 
real appreciation takes place in the longer run, but the outcome could be greater. 
Lartey et al. (2012) investigate Dutch Disease impact of foreign remittances in 
countries under both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. They find 
stronger Dutch Disease impact in countries under fixed nominal exchange rate 
regimes. Similarly, Fielding and Gibson (2012) find a stronger Dutch Disease 
impact of foreign aid on countries under fixed exchange rate regimes.  
Pooled OLS Estimation of Traded to Non-Traded Sector Ra-
tio (TNT) 
Results of pooled OLS regressions of TNT for different specifications 
are presented in table 5. Remittances to GDP, has the expected negative sign 
and is statistically significant at 10% level of significance. The coefficient on of 
the squared term for remittances is very small (0.001), and is significant at the 
10% level. Coefficients on foreign aid as percent of GDP and as per capita, 
have unexpectedly positive signs. However, remittances as per capita is only is 
significant at a 5% level.     
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued on next page) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Pooled OLS estimates of Traded to Non-Traded ratio (TNT) 
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Dependent variable is Traded to Non-Traded ratio (TNT) 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) 
    
Remittances (% of GDP) -0.018*   
 (0.010)   
Remittances (% of GDP) squared  0.001*   
 (0.000)   
Log Remittances (per capita)  -0.018 -0.017 
  (0.021) (0.022) 
ODA ( Net ODA+ Official aid % of GDP)  0.001 0.001  
 (0.002) (0.002)  
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per capita)   0.028** 
   (0.011) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) -0.025 -0.025 -0.021 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) -0.022 -0.021 -0.013 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.059) 
Log trade openness( X+M as % of GDP)  -0.012 -0.026 -0.067* 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.035) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) 0.011** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
M2 ( % GDP) 0.000 0.001 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDP per capita -0.275*** -0.261*** -0.270*** 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.056) 
Constant 2.641*** 2.562*** 2.631*** 
 (0.419) (0.398) (0.425) 
    
Observations 167      167       167 
R-squared 0.710 0.702 0.710 
Number of countries        8        8 8 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  Asterisk ***, 
**, * indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Country fixed effects and time variables may have significant effects on 
the TNT ratio.    
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Fixed-Effect Estimation of Traded to Non-Traded Sector Ra-
tio (TNT) 
Results of fixed effect estimates of TNT for different specifications are 
presented in table 6.  
Table 6: Fixed-Effect estimates of Traded to Non-Traded ratio 
(TNT)  
 
Dependent variable is Traded to Non-Traded ratio (TNT) 
Regressors  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Remittances (% of GDP) -0.016**   
 (0.006)   
Remittances (% of GDP) squared  0.000   
 (0.000)   
Log Remittances (per capita)  -0.082* -0.086* 
  (0.038) (0.038) 
ODA ( Net ODA+ Official aid % of 
GDP)  
0.010* 0.008  
 (0.004) (0.006)  
Log ODA (Net ODA+ Official aid per 
capita) 
  0.050* 
   (0.024) 
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of GDP) 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) -0.090** -0.013 -0.005 
 (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) 
Log trade openness( X+M as % of GDP)  -0.052 0.005 0.042 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.036) 
Government Expenditure ( % of GDP) -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
M2 ( % GDP) -0.001 -0.003* -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDP per capita 0.007   
 (0.171)   
GDP Growth  0.003 0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 1.711** 1.594*** 1.498*** 
 (0.535) (0.221) (0.173) 
    
Observations 167 165 165 
R squared (within) 0.853 0.854 0.854 
Number of countries 8 8 8 
Country fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. D-K standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  As-
terisk ***,**,* indicates significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively.  
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Like with pooled OLS, remittances appear statistically significant with a 
negative sign, and foreign aid (ODA) has a positive sign. The squared term for 
remittances is zero and insignificant. These findings reflect that remittances af-
fect the composition of traded and non-traded sector, and foreign aid does not 
have any negative impact. Time fixed effects and country fixed characteristics 
might have a bearing on these results, making aid statistically insignificant in the 
fixed effect model. Table 7 presents summary findings related to two dependent 
variables using two different models.  
Table 7: Estimates of REER and TNT, Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect models  
 
Dependent variable is log of Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) and TNT  
               REER               TNT 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Regressors Pooled  
OLS 
IV-2 FE  Pooled 
OLS 
FE 
     
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.205***  -0.018* -0.016** 
 (0.029)  (0.010) (0.006) 
Remittances (% of GDP) squared -0.007***  0.001* 0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Log Remittances (per capita)  0.191*   
  (0.110)   
ODA ( Net ODA+ Official aid % 
of GDP) 
-0.052***  0.001 0.010* 
 (0.003)  (0.002) (0.004) 
Log ODA (per capita)  0.085   
  (0.071)   
Foreign Direct Investment  (% of 
GDP) 
-0.030 0.003 -0.025 0.001 
 (0.061) (0.040) (0.020) (0.006) 
Log terms of trade (TOT) 0.129 -0.231*** -0.022 -0.090** 
 (0.263) (0.069) (0.047) (0.027) 
Log trade openness  -0.516*** -0.070 -0.012 -0.052 
 (0.181) (0.129) (0.027) (0.031) 
Government Expenditure ( % of 
GDP) 
-0.011 0.002 0.011** -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) 
M2 (% of GDP) -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log per capita GDP -0.296* 0.788*** -0.275*** 0.007 
 (0.161) (0.168) (0.055) (0.171) 
     
Observations 167 137 167 167 
R-squared ( within) 0.841 0.716 0.710 0.853 
Number of countries  8 8 8 8 
Country fixed effect - Yes - Yes 
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Based on the IV-2 fixed effect estimates (column 2) if per capita remittances 
increase by one percent, controlling for other factors, then on an average REER 
appreciates by 0.191 percent. Alternatively, if per capita remittances double, 
REER appreciates by 19.1 percent which is similar to Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo’s (2004) findings. They found that a doubling of per capita remittances 
raises real exchange rate by 23 percent in 13 Latin American countries. On the 
other hand, remittances (as percent of GDP) are negatively associated with the 
traded to non-traded sector ratio (TNT) and statistically significant at conven-
tional levels in both pooled OLS and Fixed Effect models. Fixed effect estimates 
of TNT (column 4) show that a one percentage point increase in remittances to 
GDP leads to fall in traded to non-traded ratio by 0.016.   Both the magnitudes 
of spending and resource movement effects are substantial and economically 
significant. These findings indicate the loss of international competitiveness, 
thereby reducing export volume, and contraction of the traded manufacturing 
sector. Over the period per capita remittances in South Asian countries increased 
manifold (in Bangladesh 13 times) and the service sector which is primarily non-
tradable expanded substantially (in Bangladesh it expanded by almost 64 per-
cent), whereas the manufacturing sector, relatively speaking, shrank.  
Foreign aid (ODA), however, is largely statistically insignificant. It is neg-
atively associated with REER and positively associated with TNT. However, in 
our case foreign aid has no statistically significant impact on real effective ex-
change rate appreciation and relative growth of non-traded sector.     
Terms of trade in both the spending effect and resource allocation re-
gressions is statistically significant and negatively associated with the real ex-
change rate and the traded to non-traded goods ratio under the fixed effect 
model. It indicates that the terms of trade exerts pressure on resources to relo-
cate from the tradable to the non-tradable sectors. However, improvement in 
the terms of trade may cause a trade surplus leading to nominal exchange rate 
appreciation. To arrest the loss in international competitiveness due to nominal 
exchange rate appreciation, South Asian countries devalue their own currencies 
occasionally. This nominal exchange rate devaluation might be one of the rea-
sons for the negative association between the terms of trade and REER. 
No statistically significant linear dependence of REER and TNT on for-
eign direct investment was detected. Trade openness appears statistically signif-
icant in pooled OLS estimates of REER only. Broad money supply (M2) is not 
statistically significant in the fixed effect estimates of REER and TNT. Per capita 
GDP has statistically significant effect on REER and TNT in the fixed effect 
Time fixed effect   - Yes - Yes 
Notes: Regressions contain constants. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in parenthesis. D-K standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity, cross sectional dependence and autocorrelation.  Asterisk ***,**,* indicates 
significance at  1 ,5 and 10% level, respectively. Primary school enrollment ratio is the instrument variable.  
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and pooled OLS models, respectively. It indicates that Ballasa-Samuelson hy-
pothesis holds in the South Asia.  
Consequences of Dutch Disease  
Lopez, Monila and Bussolo (2008) mention three adverse impacts of real 
exchange rate appreciation caused by international transfers like remittances and 
foreign aid. First, a negative impact on the traded sector, reinforced by rising 
inflation and economy wide wages. The adverse impact may be magnified fur-
ther if labour supply falls. Reservation wages in the remittances receiving house-
holds may increase or the returning migrant may attach higher value to leisure.   
Secondly, any current account deficit may widen. If increased consump-
tion demand induced by transfers is not covered by the non-tradables, import 
demand will increase. Due to the increase in import demand coupled with the 
fall in exports due to the loss in international competiveness, the current account 
balance will worsen.     
If the international transfers do not go back abroad through increased 
imports, a large inflow will increase the money supply, and be inflationary. Also, 
prices of financial assets and real estate shoot up after a surge in remittances. 
This distorts the allocation of investment across different sectors.    
Furthermore, and most importantly, because of Dutch Disease effects, 
developing countries may experience ‘premature deindustrialization’ (Rodrik, 
2015). The term ‘premature deindustrialization’ was first coined by Dasgupta 
and Singh (cited in Rodrik, 2015). This term refers to vanishing competitiveness 
and deindustrialization, before a proper phase of manufacturing competitive-
ness. In most advanced industrialized countries at the earlier phase of the mod-
ern increased growth experience, the share of manufacturing value added in na-
tional income and the employment share of manufacturing rises at first, and then 
begins to decline with a mature economy; eventually services dominate both 
value added and employment shares. This points to an inverted U shaped rela-
tion between income per-capita and growth on the one hand and manufacturing 
value added and employment shares in the economy, a process driven by labour 
productivity increases in manufacturing. The process of the relative decline in 
manufacturing output and employment usually took several generations in the 
advanced developed countries. In contemporary developing countries, this pro-
cess of the decline in manufacturing may be much faster than that experienced 
by the world’s older developed economies, and certain regions, such as sub-Sa-
haran Africa, may miss out on the industrialization experience altogether; see the 
evidence cited in Rodrik (2015). Globalisation factors leading to a fall in manu-
factures prices, coupled with a remittance induced prevention of productivity 
increases in manufacturing may hasten the process of premature deindustrializa-
tion.    
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Besides the loss of the dynamic gains in growth from a prolonged expe-
rience of manufacturing competitiveness, there are major adverse political con-
sequences of premature deindustrialization. Historically, industrialization in the 
western societies shaped modern society; played a great role in establishing mod-
ern welfare states, promoting more egalitarian societies and the emergence of 
democratic institutions. Premature deindustrialization may therefore retard dem-
ocratic development, the provision of social protection and public goods, as well 
as perpetuate inequality in the developing countries of today.  
Deindustrialization: South Asian Context 
Our discussion here is mainly confined to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Nepal and Sri Lanka for which data is more readily available. In South Asia over 
the period, services have been expanding, while the manufacturing sector has 
been shrinking in relative terms, as illustrated in Figure 5. In Nepal, manufactur-
ing value added was almost 4 percent of GDP in the 1970s, reaching a peak of 
9 percent in 1990s, and then started to fall in 2000s. In 2013, it was only 6.5 
percent of GDP. Service sector value added grew to 49 percent of GDP in 2013. 
Value added in the manufacturing and service sectors followed the same pattern 
in Pakistan as well. Mughal (2013) analyzes how remittances can foster a remit-
tance dependency mindset in the context of Pakistan; this could also be applica-
ble to Bangladesh.  
 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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Manufacturing value added fluctuates between 14 to 15 percent of GDP 
over the period, whereas service sector value added reached 53.8 percent in 2013. 
Manufacturing value added in Sri Lanka was little higher than that of Pakistan 
(about 17 percent) but it also tends to fall after reaching a high of about 19 
percent. In Bangladesh, manufacturing value added grew slowly from about 5 
percent in 1970s to about 17 percent in 2010s. Manufacturing value added in 
India rose by 4 percentage points from 1972 to 2013, while the service sector 
value added increased by 13 percentage points during the period. 
Figure 6 illustrates employment in industry and service sectors for the 
period of 1972 to 2013 in South Asian countries. Over the period, there is an 
upward trend in employment in service sector and a downward trend in employ-
ment in industry. In Pakistan, employment in industry and service sector was 
20.3 and 26.8 percent of total employment, respectively in 1980. Employment 
in industry fluctuated between 20-21 percent from the period of 1972 to 2013, 
while employment in service sector, with some ups and downs, increased over 
the period. Sri Lanka shows an upward trend for service sector employment and 
downward trend in industry employment. Bangladesh also shows a divergence 
Figure 5: Manufacturing and services value added (% of GDP) in South 
Asian countries 
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between employment in industry and service sector. However, India shows con-
vergence. But actual employment in manufacturing sector is lower as industry 
includes manufacturing along with mining, construction, and public utilities. 
 
Amirapu and Subramanian (2015) term deindustrialization in India as ‘premature 
non-industrialization’ because India never experienced sufficient industrializa-
tion in the first place. The same applies to all other South Asian countries where 
service sector became large (almost 50% of GDP) and manufacturing sector 
starts to fall before reaching its peak. Also, there may be missing aspects of the 
structural changes in the production process, as expounded by Storm (2015). 
The structural change comes through stages -- firstly absorbing existing technol-
ogy, then catching up with technologically advanced countries, and finally con-
tinuing manufacturing activities with accumulated knowledge; see Storm (2015). 
Migrant’s remittances to South Asia might have been one of the stumbling 
blocks in the way of this type of structural transformation.  
Utilization of Remittances   
The lion’s share of foreign remittances to South Asia is spent on con-
sumption, whereas a meager share is spent on investment purposes. So far two 
household remittance surveys have been conducted in Bangladesh -- by the In-
ternational Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2009, and by the Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (BBS) in 2013. The IOM (2010) findings reveal that in most 
Figure 6: Employment in industry and service sector in South Asian 
countries 
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cases (80 percent) migrants send remittances primarily to meet family expenses 
and the second major purpose is paying off debt and celebration of religious 
festivals. In only a small number of cases (5 percent) remittances are spent on 
buying land/property. BBS (2014) findings reveal that at the national level about 
84 percent of remittances received are spent, and the remainder saved. Accord-
ing to the Reserve Bank of India, more than half of the remittances to India are 
spent on family consumption, while the rest are either deposited in bank ac-
counts (20 percent) or invested in land, property, and securities (7 percent, 
Afram 2012). According to the Nepal Living Standards Survey (2011), the major 
share (79 percent) of total remittances received by households are spent on daily 
household needs, while the rest are spent on loan repayments (7 percent), buying 
property (5 percent), education(4 percent) and capital formation (2 percent). Pa-
kistan also follows a similar pattern in using remittances. The IOM (2009) survey 
in Pakistan shows that half (50.21 percent) of remittances are used in consump-
tion, and other half are used on buying real estate and agricultural machinery 
(22.12 percent), health(3.56), education (4.52), loan repayment (5.52) and savings 
(14.08). With this pattern of utilization, it can be concluded that remittances to 
South Asia fuel inflation and augment demand for non-tradables leading to real 
exchange rate appreciation and a reallocation of output towards services.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Based on the Salter-Swan-Corden-Neary framework this study has ex-
amined the Dutch Disease impact of migrant’s remittances and foreign aid. We 
have used pooled OLS and fixed effect models with panel data for eight South 
Asian countries for the period from 1975 to 2013. We have employed two sep-
arate regressions to examine the spending effect as well as the resource realloca-
tion effect. The spending effect impacts on the real effective exchange rate, 
whereas the resource reallocation effect is measured by the traded to non-traded 
output ratio. 
We have found Dutch Disease effects of migrant’s remittances; a remit-
tances elasticity of about 0.191 is found, suggesting that a doubling of per capita 
remittances raises real effective exchange rate by about 19 percent. On the other 
hand, a one percentage point increase in remittances to GDP leads to fall in 
traded to non-traded ratio by 0.016. The magnitudes of both effects are substan-
tial and economically significant. These findings imply a loss of international 
competitiveness, along with a decline in the traded manufacturing sectors in 
South Asian countries.   
Foreign aid flows are largely statistically insignificant in both spending 
effect and resource movement effect regressions, suggesting that aid is not an 
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important determinant of the real effective exchange rate, and has little impact 
on the composition of output. Moreover, in the case of tied aid, a substantial 
portion of aid goes back to the donor countries. This might be the reason for 
the statistical insignificance of aid flows in this study.        
Over the period under consideration, the relative size of the service sec-
tor has been expanding, while the manufacturing sector has been contracting in 
South Asian countries, pointing to premature deindustrialization (Amirapu and 
Subramanian 2015). Flying geese patterns of industrialization, seen in East Asia, 
where relatively less industrialized countries follow a regional industrialized 
economy are therefore precluded. To widen the path of industry-led growth in 
South Asia there should be structural transformation towards manufacturing 
sector and then service sector, but remittances can slow down this transfor-
mation or make it happen partially or miss it all together.  
Although remittances may have a strong positive impact on poverty al-
leviation in this region by increasing household consumption, policy makers 
should also pay attention to its negative impact. Agriculture in South Asia still 
accounts for about 47 percent of total employment in 2013.  Industrialization is 
necessary in this region to bring about structural transformation (Storm, 2015) 
and absorb surplus labour. ‘Services-led’ growth is either technologically less ad-
vanced, or when advanced, as in the IT sector, is too skill intensive to absorb 
surplus labour. Other services are typically non-traded, whose growth is con-
strained by domestic demand. Ultimately, manufacturing growth paves the way 
for service sector expansion. Therefore, without industrialization countries in 
this region may be mired in a quagmire of low level equilibrium trap. 
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Data Appendix  
   Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER): This is an index which considers 
nominal exchange rate, consumer price indexes of domestic country and its trad-
ing partners. We have employed Darvas’ (2012) dataset because the dataset con-
tains REER for a longer time period.  
REERt = 
𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛)  
Where, NEERt = ∏ 𝑆(𝑖)𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1  is nominal effective exchange rate, geometrically 
weighted average of bilateral nominal exchange rate [𝑆(𝑖)𝑡 ] between the do-
mestic country and its trading partner i. And the bilateral nominal exchange rate 
is measured as the foreign currency price of one unit of domestic currency.  
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   𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛)
=∏ 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑖)𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1 , geometrical weighted average of consumer 
price index of the trading partners,  𝑤𝑖 is the weight of trading partner and N is 
the number of trading partners considered. ∑ 𝑤(𝑖)𝑁𝑖=1 =1.  
   Here 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡 is used as proxy for price of non-tradables, while 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛)
 is 
used a proxy for price of tradables. Therefore, an increase in the index refers to 
appreciation, whereas a decrease refers to depreciation.  
   Traded to non-traded sector ratio (TNT): Following Lartey et al. (2012). 
We have taken sum of value added in the agriculture and manufacturing sector 
(as a share of GDP) as the proxy for the traded sector and value added in the 
service sector (as share of GDP) as the proxy for non-traded sector output. Data 
from World Bank 2015. 
   Remittances (% of GDP): Remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ 
remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers. Annual remit-
tances data as of April 2015 (World Bank 2015) is used here. GDP data is taken 
from World Development Indicators, 2015 to express remittances as percent of 
GDP. 
   Per capita remittances (US $): Population data is taken from World Devel-
opment Indicators, 2015.   
   Foreign Aid (ODA+ Aid): Official Development Assistance (ODA) consists 
of concessional loans and grants provided by the members of Development As-
sistance Committee (DAC), by multinational institutions and, by non-DAC 
countries. While, official aid refers to the aid flows from official donors to DAC 
listed countries or territories. It is also measured in two scales -- percent of GDP 
and per capita. Foreign aid per capita is in current US dollar (World Bank 2014).   
   Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Net foreign direct investment. FDI is the 
direct investment flows to domestic economy from foreign investors. FDI as 
percent of GDP is taken from World Development Indicators 2014.  
   Net Barter Terms of Trade (TOT): Index of relative prices of a country’s 
export to imports. Rise in prices of export or fall in prices of imports indicates 
improvement in terms of trade. The index is calculated as the percentage ratio 
of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes (Base year 
2000=100)(World Bank 2014). 
   General government final consumption expenditure (GOVEX): Sum total 
of government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services. This 
also includes compensation of employees. This is measured in percent of GDP 
(World Bank 2014). 
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   Per capita GDP (GDPPC): Per capita GDP is expressed in current US dol-
lars (World Bank 2014). 
   Money and quasi money, M2, (percent of GDP): Sum total of currency 
outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, 
savings, foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central gov-
ernment, and time deposit (World Bank 2014).  
  Crop production index (2004-2006 = 100): It is the index of agricultural pro-
duction of each year relative to the base year 2004-2006(World Bank 2015) 
  Primary school enrollment ratio: Percent of the population of official pri-
mary education age are enrolled in primary school (World Bank 2015). 
 
